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BORK WAS THE BEGINNING: CONSTITUTIONAL
MORALISM AND THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SELECTION
Gary L. McDowell *
On October 23, 1987, the United States Senate committed what
many considered then-and what many still consider today-to
be an unforgivable political and constitutional sin. Wielding its
power to advise and consent on nominations to the Supreme
Court of the United States, the upper house voted 58-42 not to
confirm Judge Robert H. Bork.' The vote, which was the largest
margin of defeat in history for a nominee to the Supreme Court,
concluded one of the most tumultuous political battles in the his-
tory of the republic, a battle that would transform the process of
judicial selection for years to come.2
Bork, of course, was not the first or the only nominee to be de-
nied confirmation. From the days of the Washington Administra-
tion onward, some thirty of the 144 nominees whose names have
been sent to the Senate for confirmation, including Bork, have
been rejected.3 What made the Bork confirmation so historic was
that it was the first time that the Senate chose to deny confirma-
tion to a nominee whose professional qualifications and legal
abilities were never in question. The nominee had been Solicitor
General of the United States, a Yale law professor, a scholar
* Tyler Haynes Interdisciplinary Professor of Leadership Studies and Political Sci-
ence, University of Richmond. B.A., 1972, University of South Florida; M.A., 1974, Mem-
phis State University; A.M., 1978, University of Chicago; Ph.D., 1979, University of Vir-
ginia.
1. 133 CONG. REC. 14,985, 15,011 (1987). Note that Judge Bork is currently a mem-
ber of the University of Richmond Law School faculty.
2. For accounts of the Bork hearings and their political implications, see ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 269-355 (1990);
ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 208-
327 (1989); and EUGENE W. HICKOK & GARY L. McDOWELL, JUSTICE VS. LAW: COURTS AND
POLITICS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 148-62 (1993).
3. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 13 (rev. ed. 1999).
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whose work in the field of antitrust law was widely acclaimed,'
and, most recently, a judge on the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.5
Bork was denied a seat on the High Court because of his ideas,
in particular, for his understanding of how a Justice was obli-
gated to interpret the Constitution and the laws made pursuant
to it. In brief, Bork's jurisprudential sin was that he agreed with
Chief Justice John Marshall that "the most sacred rule of inter-
pretation" is that the "great duty of a judge who construes an in-
strument, is to find the intention of its makers."6 For Bork,
originalism was the only, or at least the primary, means of inter-
pretation. In his view, it would never be legitimate for a judge to
substitute his moral judgment for the moral judgment of the leg-
islator or the founder.7 To his critics, this put him outside what
they insisted was the mainstream of legal opinion and suggested
that he lacked judicial temperament.8
Bork's supporters and critics alike could agree on one thing: his
adherence to such a doctrine of originalism would mean an ap-
proach to judging that would likely call into question the doc-
trinal premises of such cases as Griswold v. Connecticut9 and Roe
v. Wade.I° At a minimum, even if those decisions would not be
overturned, his approach would surely put the brakes on the con-
stitutional moralism that had led to them and which character-
ized much of the work of the Supreme Court at least since the as-
cension of Earl Warren to the center chair. 1 The senatorial
attack on Bork's jurisprudence focused on how such an originalist
view of interpretation would cramp American constitutional law
4. See BRONNER, supra note 2, at 62-63, 73, 82; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
5. BORK, supra note 2, at 272-73.
6. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 167-69 (Gerald Gun-
ther ed., 1969).
7. See ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11
(1984) ("In a constitutional democracy the moral content of law must be given by the mo-
rality of the framer or the legislator, never by the morality of the judge."); see also Robert
H. Bork, Foreword to GARY L. McDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, at v-xi (1985).
8. See ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 298.
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 465-77 (1990).
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and the willingness of the Court to create new rights such as that
of the right to privacy in Griswold and that of abortion in Roe.12
The effect was deadly. The New York Times reported on the
early volley of criticism launched against Bork by the Democratic
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Joe Biden, this
way: "Biden's sweeping invocations of human rights antedating
the Constitution were far easier to grasp than Judge Bork's insis-
tent examinations of the purported legal derivations of such
rights."13 Bork's serious and scholarly defense of an ancient the-
ory of interpretation would be no match for the glittering rhetoric
of his critics. When Senator Alan Simpson asked Judge Bork why
he wished to be on the Supreme Court, and the nominee an-
swered that it would be "an intellectual feast," the Democrats
were able to cement the image of Bork as an unfeeling, uncaring
academic.14
The importance of the Bork fight can be seen in who finally
came to occupy the chair he would have held. After a false start
with Judge Douglas Ginsburg, the Reagan Administration opted
for a lesser known United States Circuit Court judge from Cali-
fornia, Judge Anthony Kennedy. 5 Unlike Bork, Kennedy had no
real paper trail, and, unlike Bork, he did not seem to be intellec-
tually rooted in any substantial jurisprudential soil.16 History has
made that much, at least, very clear.
In several cases, but especially in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey7 and, most recently, Law-
rence v. Texas,i" Justice Kennedy has been instrumental in
racheting out the limits of constitutional moralism, helping to
craft the Casey opinion in league with Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor and David Souter to uphold Roe v. Wade, 9 and writing
for the majority of the Court in Lawrence to strike down state
laws that made homosexual sodomy illegal on the basis of popular
12. See BRONNER, supra note 2, at 158-60; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 297-98.
13. R.W. Apple Jr., The Bork Hearings: Trying to Sway the Doubters; Judge is Wit-
ness: His Burden of Proof, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1987, at A26, quoted in HICKOK &
MCDOWELL, supra note 2, at 151.
14. See BRONNER, supra note 2, at 275-76.
15. ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 299.
16. Id. at 300.
17. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
18. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
19. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 308.
2005]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
views of morality.2" In Kennedy's view, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment allows the Court to weigh the "sub-
stantive validity" of legislation;21 but more, it also posits a notion
of liberty that has "transcendent dimensions,"22 dimensions the
boundaries of which "are not susceptible of expression as a simple
rule."23 As the plurality opinion in Casey put it: "At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."24
These contrasting ideas about the nature and extent of judicial
power-Bork's originalism and Kennedy's "transcendent" notion
of rights awaiting judicial discovery-lie at the heart of the cur-
rent battles over President George W. Bush's nominations to the
lower courts and are central to what will surely be a bloodbath
should he have the opportunity to appoint someone to the Su-
preme Court.25 Given that the President is on record indicating
that Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas are his models
of the sorts of Justices he might appoint26 (both clearly in the
Bork tradition), it seems safe to say that the Democratic members
of the Senate must look upon Anthony Kennedy as their model
20. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
21. Id. at 575.
22. Id. at 562.
23. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
24. Id. at 851.
25. It is not uncommon for those on the liberal side of the present constitutional di-
vide to dismiss originalism in constitutional interpretation as nothing more than "a judi-
cial tool of convenience and not one of restraint." See William P. Marshall, The Judicial
Nomination Wars, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 819, 829 (2005). As is argued elsewhere in this is-
sue, the idea of a principled resort to originalism is "simply untenable" because, it is al-
leged, all too often those who proclaim themselves to be originalists "have been willing to
manipulate not only their applications of originalism but also their views on deference to
elected officials, judicial restraint, and judicial power in order to accomplish specific re-
sults." See id. at 829-31. But the fact is, originalism is not simply a matter of deferring to
the political branches on all matters of policy but of using the original meaning of the Con-
stitution as the benchmark of legitimacy against which such political judgments must be
measured. Voting to strike down misbegotten legislation does not make an advocate of
originalism into a judicial activist. Nor is it enough to suggest that because those who es-
pouse a jurisprudence of original intent occasionally stray from the path that the idea of
originalism itself is flawed or insufficient. It is only to say that even those with the true
faith still can sin. Conservative activism that abandons the original meaning of the Con-
stitution to achieve particular results is not more legitimate than such activism from the
left; and in both cases it is the original meaning that is the most reliable standard by
which to measure the extent of such judicial transgressions.
26. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Vows to Seek Conservative Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2002, at A24 (noting that Bush has "singled out Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
M. Thomas, the court's two most conservative members, as justices whom he held in high
regard").
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nominee, the best they might hope for from a Republican admini-
stration. Where Bork felt himself bound by what Thomas Jeffer-
son called the "chains of the Constitution,"27 Kennedy and his ilk
would never feel so constrained. Indeed, pursuing justice is how
they see the essence of their jobs. It is not too much to say that
Kennedy the Justice has revealed himself to be very much in line
with Kennedy the senator when it comes to constitutional inter-
pretation.
These facts are worth recalling, not to dwell on the long-ago po-
litical tragedy of the Bork confirmation battle, or even to be criti-
cal of Justice Kennedy, although the temptation on both counts is
very strong indeed. Rather, the facts point toward the necessity of
raising a simple question that all too frequently gets lost in the
ideological shuffle that has come to surround judicial nominations
to the federal bench: Is it conceivable that the Founders created
the federal judiciary with the expectation (or even the hope) that
it would be the moral guardian of the people, an institution, as
the Court put it in Casey, "invested with the authority to...
speak before all others for [the people's] constitutional ideals?"2"
In answering this question it is necessary to reflect briefly upon
both the general understanding of the Founders on these matters
and the constitutional details of the judicial power they actually
created. The Founders generally were concerned above all with
the abuses, and the potential abuses, of political power.29 No one
among them argued for unlimited power for those who would in-
stitutionally possess such power to go forth and do justice: not the
legislature; not the executive; and not the judiciary. The Foun-
ders were dedicated, rather, to the idea of limited government
rooted in a constitution of enumerated powers.3 ° Perhaps most
27. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS 449, 455 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
28. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868.
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 332-33 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(describing the threat of the "encroaching nature" of power); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, su-
pra, at 349-51 (James Madison) (arguing for the division of government so that each
branch "may be a check on the other"); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra, at 525 (Alexander
Hamilton) (stating that the power of the government is derived from and subject to the
power of the people).
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, supra note 29, at 86 (James Madison) ("In the first place
it is to be remembered, that the general government is not to be charged with the whole
power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated
objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by
the separate provisions of any.").
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important, they were committed to the proposition, as Chief Jus-
tice Marshall put it in Marbury v. Madison,31 that a written con-
stitution was "the greatest improvement on political institu-
tions."32 And they believed with Justice Joseph Story that the
Constitution should have "a fixed, uniform, permanent construc-
tion. It should be ... not dependent upon the passions or parties
of particular times, but the same yesterday, to-day, and for-
ever. ,
33
In light of what some on the federal judiciary have come to
boast about as their powers, it pays to consider the way the Con-
stitution treats the judiciary as an institution. First, the Consti-
tution does not create a federal judicial system; it grants a judi-
cial power and leaves the creation of the institution to the
Congress. 34 There is not, for example, any provision for a set
scheme of courts. The Constitution simply states there shall be
merely "one supreme Court" and "such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish."35 By that lan-
guage, the Congress could create many inferior courts, a few infe-
rior courts, or no inferior courts at all, thereby leaving all the
cases and controversies to the state courts in the first instance. It
is instructive, for example, that it was not until 1891 that the
Congress saw the need to create the federal appeals courts.36
Second, there are no constitutional requirements that there be
any particular number of Justices.3 ' The only explicit provision is
that there be one Chief Justice of the United States, and we only
learn that in Article I, where the Constitution provides that in
cases of an impeachment of the president that "the Chief Justice
shall preside."" True to the original intention, the number of Jus-
31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
32. Id. at 176.
33. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
426, at 303 (3d ed. 1858).
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish .... [Tihe supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Con-
gress shall make.").
35. Id. art. III, § 1.
36. See Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826.
37. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
38. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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tices of the Supreme Court has varied over time-from as few as
five to as many as ten-as Congress has seen fit.
39
Third, there are no specific minimal requirements for the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court any more than for the judges of the in-
ferior courts. There are, for example, no specifications for age,
residence, or even citizenship, as there are for representatives,
senators, and presidents. ° Nor is there any concern for experi-
ence or even if the nominee has legal training.41 It was assumed,
apparently, that these factors would be considered by the presi-
dent who would nominate and by the Senate who would advise
and consent to any nomination.
Fourth, the Constitution is largely silent on exactly how the ju-
dicial process shall be constituted and how the courts are to con-
duct their business. In comparison to the enumeration of powers
and duties listed in Article I for the legislative branch42 and in
Article II for the executive,43 Article III is remarkably vague.'
Like the number of Justices, this area, too, was left up to Con-
gress as was seen in the first Congress's passage of the Judiciary
and Process Acts of 1789." It is worth recalling that it was not
until the Judiciary Act of 1925 that the legislature gave the Court
some control over its own docket including the power to issue
writs of certiorari.46 In short, as indicated earlier, the Constitu-
tion created a judicial power but left it up to the more representa-
tive institutions to create the structure of the judicial system.
Fifth, not only is the original jurisdiction of the Court limited,
but the appellate jurisdiction is granted subject to "such Excep-
39. See Judiciary Act of 1866, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794, 794 ("[T]he supreme court of
the United States shall hereafter consist of a chief justice and nine associate justices.");
Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89, 89 (providing that the Supreme Court "shall
consist of five justices only"). There have been nine justices on the Supreme Court since
1869. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44. Despite attempts to alter the size of
the Court, the number has remained at nine due to political and practical necessity.
40. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, with id. art. I, and id. art. II (comparing the age and
citizenship requirements for representatives and senators with Article III, which contains
no such requirements for judges).
41. See id. art. I, § 2, cls. 1, 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
42. Id. art. I.
43. Id. art. II.
44. See id. art. III.
45. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 73-93 (creating the lower federal
courts and their powers); Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94 (creating and de-
scribing the judicial process of federal courts).
46. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 936, 937-39.
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tions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."47
During the Civil War era Congress undertook not only to remove
jurisdiction from the Court, but to do so in the middle of a case
making its way through the Court (arguments in fact had already
been heard).4" The Court itself upheld congressional removal of
Supreme Court jurisdiction in its 1869 decision of Ex parte
McCardle.4 9 It has always been understood since then that Con-
gress has a reasonably free hand to make such exceptions and
regulations to appellate jurisdiction as it sees fit.5" Indeed, the
Supreme Court has held that when it comes to making exceptions
or regulations to appellate jurisdiction, the power of Congress is
"plenary."51
Sixth, one looks in vain at the records of the Federal Conven-
tion for any detailed discussion of what we have come to call judi-
cial review-the power to invalidate legislation as unconstitu-
tional. It was not until the Anti-Federalists' Brutus52 and the
Federal Farmer53 attacked the Constitution's provisions for a ju-
diciary that Alexander Hamilton had to return to the subject in
The Federalist to give a defense of the courts as "an intermediate
body between the people and the legislature, in order.., to keep
the latter within the limits assigned to their authority."54 But
even then Hamilton insisted that the courts would "have neither
Force nor Will, but merely judgment."5 When it came to inter-
preting the Constitution and the law, judges would be bound by
"the intention of the people" as expressed in their Constitution,
which was to be deemed the "fundamental law."56 There is noth-
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
48. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 304-07 (1985) (describing the events surrounding Ex
parte McCardle).
49. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); see also CURRIE, supra note 48, at 304-07.
50. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514-15.
51. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 472-73 (1944).
52. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 358-452 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
Brutus argued that the Constitution gave the judges power to "enable them to mould the
government, into most any shape they please." Id. at 422; see also id. at 419-22, 442.
53. See id. at 214-357. The Federal Farmer insisted that when it came to the proposed
judiciary that the people were "more in danger of sowing the seeds of arbitrary govern-
ment in this department than in any other." Id. at 316.
54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 29, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton).
55. Id. at 523.
56. Id. at 525.
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ing in the writings of Hamilton or any of the other Founders to
suggest it would be legitimate for the courts to create new rights
out of whole cloth.
These six facts are essential to understanding why the politics
of judicial selection has become so vicious and vitriolic. The courts
have become the objects of such political wrath as has been seen
in the past two decades because over time they have assumed
constitutional powers never envisioned and never granted. But
even if one might wish to argue that the Founders implicitly in-
tended the courts to be the moral guardians of the republic, and
to embark on the creation of new rights such as privacy, abortion,
and homosexual sodomy, surely one would not also wish to argue
that so important and powerful an institution as courts thus de-
scribed should have their powers and jurisdiction left open to
congressional tampering. But on this point the Constitution is ab-
solutely clear. Congress's power to fashion the court system of in-
ferior courts, to set the number of judges and justices, to make
exceptions to, and create regulations for, appellate jurisdiction,
and to establish the rules of civil and criminal procedure is indeed
plenary.57 The only reasonable conclusion one can reach is that
the judicial power of today is something far different from what
the Constitution's framers and ratifiers envisioned and empow-
ered.
As James Madison said of the legislatures of his time, so might
we say of the courts of our day: The judiciary has "every where
extend[ed] the sphere of its activity, and draw n] all power into
its impetuous vortex."" And it is into that impetuous vortex that
the politics of judicial selection in our day has inevitably been
pulled. Where the Founders could say with confidence that
"Uudges... are not to be presumed to possess any peculiar
knowledge of the mere policy of public measures,"59 more recent
generations have come to have confidence that judges are indeed
quite well equipped to deal with the most sensitive areas of pol-
icy. And as the courts have become more politically immersed in
57. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 29, at 333 (James Madison).
59. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1966) (statement of Mr. Gorham).
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the "mere policy of public measures,""° the choice of who shall
wield those vast extra-constitutional powers has become ever
more politically important with the sad result that the federal
courts are no longer left above the fray.
60. Id.
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